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This dissertation, entitled Macrobius and the Cardinal Virtues, examines the Neo-
platonic virtue ethics of Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius, a Roman author living 
at the turn of the 4th and 5th Centuries AD, on the basis of his two major works, 
Saturnalia and Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis. In the field of classical studies 
there has been a long-standing and dominant view that Macrobius was just an in-
significant compiler, as a consequence of which both he and his works have re-
ceived little attention. This is testified to P. De Paolis’ Macrobius-bibliography as 
well, which presents a rather moderate quantity of special literature compared to 
other ancient authors being researched. However, the interest in Macrobius has 
increased somewhat of late (one obvious sign of this is the publication of Saturna-
lia in three volumes by the Loeb Classical Library series) and in the evaluation of 
his works partly new aspects have started to play a role, partly already existing 
concepts were taken into consideration. As a result of these, a newly shaping Mac-
robius-image is being created; this dissertation is designed to contribute to this with 
its results. 
 The cardinal virtues in question (i.e. prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo and iusti-
tia) nominated by Plato played a central part in ancient moral philosophies. Neo-
Platonic philosophers – among them firstly Plotinus and following him Porphyry – 
elaborated a specific version of the four virtues’ doctrine, which linked the exercise 
of the virtues mentioned above tightly to the soul’s ascension, to the ascent to the 
‘One’. While writing the commentary on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, Macrobius 
presents this doctrine of virtues (I 8), although it differs from his Greek predeces-
sors in several details; therefore he constructs a specifically Roman virtue theory, 
which throws new light upon the role and significance of the individual practising 
his virtues in his own spiritual search. 
 The author’s virtus-concept has previously been analysed by some researchers, 
but these examinations have only touched upon a rather narrow spectrum of his 
writings, the four virtues having been examined inclusively rather than separately. 
There is also another known view, according to which no examples can be found 
for the cardinal virtues in Macrobius’ Saturnalia, which is why there is nothing to 
compare the virtue ethics of Commentarii to. These reasons form the basis for the 
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aims of this dissertation by extending the range of research – to make a survey of 
all the occurrences of the four virtues in Macrobius’ above mentioned two works 
(his third writing left to us is a grammatical tractate, which is not relevant from this 
aspect), then to draw conclusions on the grounds of the accumulated texts’ analysis 
about the author’s attitude to the virtues forming the base of Roman society’s scale 
of values. 
 
 
Research methods 
 
 Taking the premises of the scientific literature and the sparse evidence referring 
to Macrobius into account, this dissertation first deals with the issue of the writer’s 
identity in the scope of a historical examination. By means of prosopography and 
source analysis it aims to provide an answer to the question as to which periods the 
lifework of this Late Antiquity’s author could be set in, sc. this is not negligible 
from the aspect of his works’ better understanding. Following this, while introduc-
ing the three works, it defines an attitude towards the order of origin, primarily by 
structure and content analysis of the prefaces of Saturnalia and Commentarii, fur-
thermore it examines the features of Macrobius’ writing style by means of text 
interpretation. 
 The second, major part of this dissertation is built on an ethical-terminological 
examination. The starting point is Commentarii I. 8., wherein the author summa-
rises the main doctrines of neo-Platonic virtue ethics. Thereafter the premises and 
sources of Macrobius’ concepts are introduced, as a result of which, it can be stated 
what differs in the author’s virtue perception from the neo-Platonic samples as well 
as what kind of consequences these differences take with respect to the interpreta-
tion of virtutes cardinales. 
 At this point it becomes necessary to introduce the virtue examples of Saturna-
lia into the examination; henceforth, both works of Macrobius play equally impor-
tant roles. While revealing the features of prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo and 
iustitia, the ground for comparison is provided by the topic’s ancient philosophical 
and literary antecedents, in relation to which the definitions of each virtue are in-
vestigated, then the analysis continues by considering and interpreting the exam-
ples collected from Saturnalia. Regarding the afore mentioned exempla, one of the 
main questions is how they are adapted to the virtue descriptions of Commentarii: 
whether they support these definitions or just contradict them, and how they modu-
late the concept formed previously on Macrobius’ virtue perception. This complex 
philological and historical analysis provides the basis for the conclusions of this 
dissertation. 
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The results of the research 
 
 The examination of the problems concerning Macrobius’ identity resulted in the 
following: the author is most probably identical to Theodosius who held the office 
of praefectus praetorio Italiae, Illyrici et Africae in the year 430AD, during the 
reign of Valentinian III. Although Latin was most assuredly his native language, he 
was not born in Italia but came from one of the provinces – maybe from the area of 
North Africa. He does not refer to his political carrier in his own works; we can 
conclude his that he held high state positions only from his titles, indicated at the 
beginning of his works. His son Eustathius was praefectus urbi in the period be-
tween 457 and 452, while his grandson had the name Macrobius Plotinus Eudoxius. 
 Macrobius talks a lot about ancient Roman religion and ancient deities in his 
works; this topic is of great importance to him as it forms one of the main elements 
of traditional Roman culture, although it would be a mistake to assume that these 
so-called pagan beliefs determined his own religious identity as well. He does not 
mention Christianity at all in his works; in spite of this it is almost certain that he 
embraced the new belief at least formally, otherwise he could not have held the 
office which can be attributed to him. The paradoxical nature of the great silence 
surrounding Christianity becoming the state religion by the time of the author is 
well demonstrated by the fact that Macrobius is one of the most widely-read and 
popularly quoted authors of the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, his silence strengthens 
the conviction that his religiousness was based primarily upon philosophy, namely 
neo-Platonism, it being fashionable at that time. To his mind, the soul’s breaking 
free from the body, the contemplation and the ascent to the ‘One’ may be realized 
through the virtues and that these are available to each and every person. This latter 
thought can be paralleled with Christian concepts though, and this may be the point 
– the age of Macrobius – when the mutual effect of Antiquity’s final great philoso-
phical system and Christianity can be recognized before the neo-Platonic idea 
could eventually melt in the doctrines of the victorious new belief system. 
 The first of the three works left to us by Macrobius is a grammatical tractate in 
which he examines similarities and differences between Greek and Latin verbs. 
The originality of this treatise is provided by its special content and examination 
methods; because of its high standards it can be regarded more as a scientific than 
a didactic work. The other two works, Saturnalia and Commentarii, are equally 
dedicated to his son, Eustathius. By comparison of the two works’ prefaces it may 
be assumed that Saturnalia was created earlier and that Commentarii, which was 
written later, is its integral continuation. Although they differ from each other as 
regards their genre, Saturnalia being a piece of symposion literature, while the 
other writing can be placed into the category of commentaries, still there is a com-
mon feature in them; via these works Macrobius wishes to transmit the values and 
rules of life important to himself to Eustathius and beyond that he also transfers a 
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huge amount of knowledge that includes almost all areas of Roman cultural his-
tory. On the grounds of the didactic intention obviously manifesting itself in Satur-
nalia and in Commentarii, as well as of the great number of examples with a didac-
tic aim, the two works can be placed among the ‘speculum of citizens’, which may 
be considered as being a sort of Fürstenspiegel. The fatherly guidance found 
within them supports the evolution of the youth’s mind from adolescence to adult-
hood, which helps the accomplishment of his personality by acquiring Roman eru-
dition and neo-Platonic philosophy in order to become vir bonus, one who is able 
to control himself, govern others and serve his community. The two works men-
tioned above are with didactic feature, born in the spirit of artes liberales; the di-
rect aim of the author with the encyclopaedic knowledge accumulated in the text is 
his son’s education, the extension of his erudition, while his indirect intention is to 
represent the traditional values of Roman culture as well as the essential ideas of 
neo-Platonic philosophy for his readers in any era. 
 Following the examination of the questions concerning the author’s identity and 
works, his ethical perception was made the subject of further investigation. The 
virtutes are at the forefront of Macrobius’ moral philosophy. In his hierarchical 
system the cardinal virtues play the most significant part; the additional virtues 
mentioned by him – which are defined as the associate virtues of virtutes cardina-
les in the dissertation – represent one aspect each. The neo-Platonic thinker elabo-
rates his theory relating to the role and significance of quattuor virtutes basically 
on the grounds of Plotinus and Porphyry’s doctrines, but the influence of other 
philosophical tendencies well known to Romans can also be demonstrated here. 
The four virtues - prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo and iustitia – are defined on the 
level of virtutes politicae, virtutes purgatoriae, virtutes animi iam purgati and of 
virtutes exemplares. The certain virtues have different functions and features on 
each level. Placing them on four consecutive levels correspond to the Greek neo-
Platonists’ perception, although significant differences are to be found in Mac-
robius’ evaluation of the virtue levels. 
 There is no divergence of opinion between Macrobius and his Greek ideals 
regarding the idea that the aim of human life is to attain happiness, which is identi-
cal to divinization in neo-Platonic interpretation, although regarding the way how 
the mentioned purpose can be achieved they differ in opinion. The Roman author’s 
ethical theory varies from his antecedents mostly in that it provides the civic vir-
tues placed on the first level of virtutes with an emphatic role. Furthermore, on the 
levels of the so-called major virtues there are some smaller differences, which may 
be explained by divergences of opinion or rather by the fact that from time to time 
the author attempts to reinterpret his masters’ train of thought on certain points 
where he considers the original concept to be illogical. Plotinus and Porphyry, who 
arranged the virtue doctrines of the former into a systematic order, both considered 
the civic or political virtues necessary for the individual as a social being, but their 
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conviction was that happiness cannot be achieved by these; they only possess a 
preparatory role in the process of ascent to the major virtues’ level. The soul’s as-
cension can only be attained by means of contemplation. 
 In contrast, Macrobius, proceeding from a syllogistic argumentation (according 
to which if the virtues render someone happy and the civic virtues are virtues, then 
happiness can be achieved by the civic virtues as well) states that the way of di-
vinization is open to people exercising civic virtues. The mentioned virtues are 
called virtutes negotiosae, while the ones of higher levels in connection with con-
templation are the virtutes otiosae. As a matter of fact, these terms are the equiva-
lents of the practical and theoretical virtues of the author and through both types 
eternal celestial happiness is attainable. At the same time he also admits that al-
though there is no difference in value regarding the final goal between virtues 
linked to vita activa and vita contemplativa, the ideal form is genus mixtum, i.e. if 
the two virtues can be found together in the individual. The mixed type is the per-
fect kind of virtues; this characterized Solon and Lykurgus, Numa and Scipio Ae-
milian. 
 Some scholars assume that the author takes this view because he misinterprets 
neo-Platonic doctrines, while others think that in fact there is no disagreement at 
all. Macrobius states the same as Plotinus, only in a more elegant rhetorical con-
text. This dissertation points out that neither of these views is convincing enough. 
Based on the text of Commentarii it seems obvious that the Late Roman writer is 
aware of neo-Platonic ethical theories, and the existence of the mentioned differ-
ences can be proved unambiguously. Compared to the concept emphasizing the 
misunderstanding of the Plotinian system it is more probable that the commentator 
deliberately deprives the original doctrine of its mysticism which was previously 
provided by the Greek philosopher. Macrobius tends to rationalize his virtue ethics 
as much as possible in order to adapt it to Roman values and mentality in the high-
est degree following the traditional method of interpretatio Romana. 
 One of the arguments against the privilege of virtutes politicae is that examples 
illustrating civic virtues do not appear in another work of his, Saturnalia. This 
dissertation argues that as Saturnalia was probably written earlier than the Com-
mentary on the Dream of Scipio it is not necessary to support a maybe non existing 
theory. On the other hand, if we take into account Macrobius’ idea that anybody 
can possess the virtues, it is not enough to look for and investigate the virtues of 
gubernatores, but in a more extended sense, they can be analysed actually in con-
nection with anyone. Thus several examples can be collected from Saturnalia but 
here it should be stressed again that these do not serve the function of supporting 
particular Macrobian virtue ethics; they can only be considered as being their ante-
cedents. Moreover, they are able to contribute to an adequate interpretation of the 
author’s virtue concept. 
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 First prudentia was examined by way of the four cardinal virtues. According to 
Macrobius prudentia politica is an intellectual virtue bearing practical wisdom in 
itself, which adjusts everything to the norm set by the intellect and decides what is 
right. On cathartic and theoretical level: its task is to realize contemplation while 
on the grade of paradigmatic virtues it is identical to divine Intellect. To this defini-
tion are added the examples of Saturnalia, which demonstrate that the interpreta-
tion of the notion can be approached from several aspects, it is the essential pre-
condition of all creative acts, it is as necessary for the foundation of a town or a 
cult as for the creation of a literary work. It is bound up with the memory and elo-
quence as wisdom is needed for speaking as well as remaining in silence. It con-
tains providence, foreboding the future, caution and the ability to create harmony. 
This virtue characterizes mainly elderly, experienced people, but we can find an 
example – the case of the juvenile Papirius Praetextatus – when it is attached to a 
young boy. Some possessors of prudentia are honoured as gods by posterity. Mac-
robius attributes this virtue to Ianus, Romulus, Homerus and Caesar among others; 
all of them are outstanding examples of the individual obtaining immortality by 
human acts. 
 According to Macrobius, people who have the virtue of temperantia do not do 
anything that should be regretted later; they exercise self-constraint, they direct 
their own desire to the appropriate way guided by the intellect. The Plotinian as-
ceticism observed on the cathartic level appears less firmly by the Roman follower, 
the complete oblivion of human desires are the requirements of only the third level; 
at the highest grade it means the Intellect’s turning towards itself. The encourage-
ment to exercise temperance is an important element of education. In Saturnalia 
the author wants to draw his son’s attention to the dangers hiding in intemperance 
by representing several versions of luxury. The writer introduces the main charac-
ters of his symposion as the eminent representatives of temperantia: in practicing 
this virtue Praetextatus, Symmachus and his friends exceed their predecessors, they 
strongly disapprove of the luxury and debauchery of Ancient Times. The author 
might exaggerate when talking about the temperance of the convivium’s partici-
pants, as the manner of the celebrations’ descriptions tend in the direction of as-
ceticism sometimes going beyond the limits of sober self-constraint. It can be ex-
plained by Macrobius’ absolute respect towards the prominent members of the 
Symmachus-circle and his neo-Platonic thought, which both motivated him to in-
troduce the leaders of pagan aristocracy in such a way that they are ahead of aver-
age people in the process of divinization, inter alia, due to their exceptional tem-
perance. 
 The main criterion of civic or political courage in Commentarii is that the soul 
can overcome the fear of danger; at the same time fear of things in the category of 
turpia is rather desirable. The author does not establish a hierarchical scale of val-
ues regarding frightful situations, thus he does not consider martial courage more 
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important than courage testified in any other areas of life. This is also proven by 
the fact that in Saturnalia he is not looking primarily for the virtue of fortitudo in 
brave warriors and in humans known for their firm character but in simple slaves 
who also have this virtus in them as much as free people. The other exemplum of 
courage worth mentioning is connected not surprisingly to Hercules; in this case 
the hero does not appear in the usual way but in the context of Sun-theology. Ac-
cording to Macrobius, Hercules is identical to the strength of Sun giving fortitudo 
by which humans become similar to gods. 
 From the four cardinal virtues the author mentions justice as the last one that 
has the task on the level of virtutes politicae of giving everybody their due. This 
terse definition recalls certain passages from Cicero and legal terminology. Here 
Macrobius does not refer to the role of iustitia coordinating the other virtues – 
which is an important feature of the definition in the ancient justice-interpretations 
– with him it only appears on higher virtue levels. On the grade of major virtues 
justice ensures consistency and an eternal union between the soul and Nus. Iustitia 
is the only one among the four cardinal virtues that is not dealt with effectively in 
Saturnalia; all in all it appears only once in connection with the Goddess Iustitia. 
In contrast, he devotes a lot of space to it in Commentarii, its introductory art ex-
amines the role of justice in the state on the basis of Plato and Cicero. Although 
iustitia does not play a significant part in Saturnalia, its associate virtues often 
occur in the most varied contexts. With their help the layers of Macrobian justice-
terminology can be revealed, which manifest themselves in the different systems of 
relations between people. 
Plotinus and Porphyry express their opinions laconically respecting the nature and 
significance of civic virtues. Starting from Plato’s theory about the three parts of 
the soul they only state that the thinking part’s virtue is prudence, the impetuous 
part has courage and temperance belongs to the desirous one, above all of which 
there is justice coordinating their functions. The civic virtues are also respectful, 
but it refers rather to the major virtues, as divinization can be achieved through 
them. On the grounds of the things mentioned above, it is obvious that Macrobius 
attributes much more significance to virtus politica, but it cannot be explained 
merely by the interpretation of the commentated Ciceronian text, as in preference 
of the civic virtues the complex influence of Roman culture, traditional values and 
mentality becomes unambiguously visible. 
 In connection with the exempla of Saturnalia there were no preliminary expec-
tations that they should correspond to the virtus-definitions in the commentaries, 
still all the passages certify that there is no contradiction between the two works’ 
virtue-image. Furthermore, the examples analysed in the dissertation exceedingly 
illustrate Commentarii I 8. The commentary on Somnium Scipionis provides the 
mature summary of Macrobius’ concept about the four virtues, and the allusions of 
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Saturnalia’s virtutes – bearing the seeds of the neo-Platonic virtue ethics in them – 
somewhat suggest this. 
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